INTRODUCTION
California, the court found that the defendant could not be held liable because being a drug addict was not a 'conduct' that was punishable under the criminal law, and it was instead a state of being. 2 Mens rea refers to the defendant's mental state during that action. Different crimes require different types of mental state for a defendant to be found criminally responsible. Under Model Penal Code § 2.02, 'a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acts purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require with respect to each material element of the offense'. Generally, a person acts 'purposely', if his conscious objective is to engage in that conduct or cause that result, and a person acts 'knowingly', if he is aware of his conduct and attendant circumstances of that behavior. 3 A person acts 'recklessly', when he behaves with a conscious disregard for a substantial risk of causing harm to others or in a manner that is grossly negligent compared to what a reasonable person would do in that circumstance. 4 Finally, a person acts 'negligently' when he engages in a behavior while failing to perceive a risk that he should otherwise have known. 5 Typically, criminal responsibility does not attach to simple negligence; the defendant must at least show a wanton disregard for human life to be held criminally responsible. neurological defect. 13 One theory argues that individuals suffer from dissociative amnesia when an extreme emotional arousal triggers a temporary dissociative state, during which the individual performs acts that he or she fails to remember later on.
14 Other scholars contend that an extreme level of arousal during conduct interferes with memory retrieval at a later time. 15 These theories are supported by clinical findings; studies find that claims of dissociation increase with the severity of violence. 16 These studies have posited that extreme emotional stress disrupts the neuroendocrine system, which would prevent memory encoding and consolidation. Elevated glucocorticoid levels, triggered by any stressful events, have also shown to inhibit retrieval of traumatic memory, by reducing the medial temporal lobe activities.
17
In contrast, organic amnesia is caused by a neurological defect. While intoxication could create such a defect, leading to an organic amnesia, such amnesia is not relevant in criminal law. Unlike other non-voluntary amnesia, intoxication-induced amnesia involves some voluntary act-ie drinking or taking drugs-at an earlier time. If the criminal law were to recognize self-induced amnesia as an exculpating or mitigating defense, then criminal defendants would be motived to cause their own amnesia to escape liability. Therefore, only organic amnesia that is not self-induced will be discussed in this note. Psychotic episodes are one common explanation for such organic amnesia. A study of 118 cases of criminal homicide revealed that paranoid schizophrenia was involved in 24 per cent of the offenders who claimed crime-related amnesia.
18 Psychosis may impair attention and inhibit memory encoding, as dissociation does.
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Post-crime amnesia that develops without a prior voluntary act is relevant to the required elements of a crime, and hence criminal responsibility, in two ways. First, amnesia may undermine a finding of criminal responsibility procedurally. An amnesiac defendant might satisfy both the actus reus and mens rea requirements of a given crime, since post-crime amnesia, depending on its source, does not necessarily show that the defendant behaved without conscious awareness of his own action at the time. But even so, if the defendant is truly amnesiac, he cannot adequately defend himself during the trial, violating his constitutional right to a fair representation. Here, the elements of a crime might be satisfied, but criminal responsibility and punishment may be nonetheless inappropriate.
Second, amnesia may undermine criminal responsibility substantively. If the amnesia were a result of a dissociative state during the crime itself, then the defendant would fail to satisfy the mens rea requirement. More specifically, during this dissociative state, the defendant would not have been able to form a conscious objective or awareness of risk, failing the mens reas requirement for most crimes. This type of amnesia resembles temporary insanity, a recognized criminal defense. Admittedly, the danger of malingering amnesia to the administration of justice is significant. After all, amnesia is easy to fake but hard to detect. But just because determination is difficult does not justify the courts disregarding claims of amnesia, especially since they are common and relevant. In fact, 10 to 70 per cent of murder cases involve amnesia in one form or another. 21 Given the frequency of amnesia claims, two developments are needed. First, we need an objective test to distinguish malingering from genuine amnesia. Some progress has been made on this front, with varying success. These tests include polygraphy, sodium amytal interviews, hypnosis, and personality tests. 22 Second, the criminal system must develop appropriate defenses for amnesiac defendants, consistent with the notion of competency to stand trial and the mens rea and actus reus requirements of a crime. This paper will focus on this second point-the inadequacy of the existing legal system in its treatment of genuine amnesiac defendants.
CURRENT LEGAL STANDARD
Despite its medical legitimacy and frequency, courts do not recognize amnesia as a separate category of defense. Instead, if amnesia is ever involved, the defendants raise it under the context of competency to stand trial, or label it an insanity defense. Although amnesia raises genuine issues of competency, courts routinely dismiss its effect. Also, amnesia does not neatly fit under the insanity defense framework, because unlike insanity, which pre-dates or is contemporaneous to the conduct in question, many types of amnesia develop after the criminal conduct.
Competency to stand trial
Ensuring that a defendant is competent to stand trial is a due process requirement under the Constitution. 23 In Dusky v United States, the Supreme Court ruled that to be competent to stand trial, the defendant must have 'a sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding' and a 'rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him'.
24 Further, in Wilson v United States, when the defendant alleged that he did not remember his accused crime, the court recognized that amnesia might be relevant to the defendant's ability to provide his own defense. 25 The D.C. Circuit Court argued for a case-by-case approach and outlined six factors to consider when evaluating whether a crime-related amnesia affects an individual's competency to stand trial:
(1) The extent to which the amnesia affected the defendant's ability to consult with and assist his lawyer; (2) The extent to which the amnesia affected the defendant's ability to testify in his own behalf; (3) The extent to which the evidence in suit could be extrinsically reconstructed . . . ; (4) The extent to which the Government assisted the defendant and his counsel in that reconstruction; (5) The strength of the prosecution's case; . . . (6) 
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Contrary to these guidelines, most courts have found an amnesiac competent to stand trial. 27 In U.S. v Andrews, the defendant was accused of bank robbery but claimed to have no memory of the crime due to a long history of alcohol and drug abuse. 29 Instead, the court relied on United States v Stevens, which held that 'amnesia is not a bar to prosecution of an otherwise competent defendant'. 30 While the court acknowledged Dusky and that there may be other factors supporting a finding of incompetency, it maintained that amnesia alone cannot sustain a finding of incompetency and such evaluation should be left to the trial court. 31 In line with this reasoning, the court held that because Andrews was capable of understanding the charges, discussing the case with his counsel, and evaluating the evidence, he was fit to stand trial.
32
Andrews is problematic because it misinterprets Wilson's holding and neglects to take the impact of amnesia on an individual's defense seriously. Wilson did not hold that amnesia should be a categorical 'bar to prosecution', 33 but instead held that amnesia should be a consideration in determining whether the defendant is competent to stand trial. Furthermore, while Andrews acknowledged that the defendant must be 'otherwise competent', 34 Andrews barely discussed how amnesia could affect the defendant's ability to stand trial. For example, the court disregarded the possibility that because of amnesia, the defendant would not be able to effectively cross-examine the witnesses, identify key witnesses, or even answer questions with confidence. Andrews' dismissal of amnesia as a relevant factor in competency analysis presumably stems from the concern that amnesia may not be genuine, or that it was self-induced through intoxication. However, these policy concerns should be balanced with the reality that amnesia could compromise an individual's ability to defend himself at trial.
Similarly, in Jackson v State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals grappled with the issue of competency under the Texas Constitution. 35 In Jackson, the psychiatrist testified that the defendant lost his memory pertaining to his crime and that this memory loss was permanent and genuine. 36 According to the psychiatrist, although the defendant could communicate with his attorney normally, because of his amnesia, the defendant remained highly suggestible. 37 For instance, the defendant constantly changed the facts of his story because of his amnesia. 38 Noting that its state constitution 26 Id. uses the same test for competency as the federal constitution, the Texas court looked to Wilson for guidance. 39 However, the court ultimately refused to give legal significance to the defendant's condition. Despite the evidence of amnesia, the court distinguished the inability to recall the events of the crime from a 'mental incapacity to stand trial '. 40 In arriving at this decision, the court relied on the overwhelming objective evidence establishing the defendant's actions. 41 The court found that because the defendant could reconstruct the facts of the crime from this evidence, the proceeding constituted a fair trial.
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Courts are similarly skeptical of amnesia defense under state criminal law. In Morrow v State, the defendant was involved in a collision, resulting in amnesia with respect to the events surrounding that collision. 43 A psychiatrist confirmed that the defendant's symptoms were consistent with those of a genuine post-traumatic amnesia. 44 Under the Maryland criminal statute, the defendant 'is incompetent to stand trial if he "is unable to understand the nature of the object of the proceeding against him or to assist in his defense"'. 45 As in Texas, the court acknowledged Wilson as precedent but instead cited Reagon v State for its factual similarity, 46 and found that the defendant was fit to stand trial. 47 Wary of the potential for an amnesia defense to promote fraudulent claims of memory loss, the court limited the 'ability to consult [the defendant's] lawyer' to merely 'communicat[ing] in a normal manner'. The court provided no analysis of the defendant's ability to 'understand the proceedings' as the court found it 'undisputed', given that the amnesia did not affect his reasoning ability or current intellectual capability. 48 However, Morrow is problematic in both its reasoning and interpretation of existing law. First, the fact that a person's general intellectual capacity remains uncompromised does not automatically lead to a conclusion that the person is fit to stand trial. While the defendant may be able to communicate normally, because of his amnesia, the defendant would not be able to refute details critical in his defense during a cross-examination. Second, the competency to stand trial relates to a broader concept of fairness during trial, and to limit it to a defendant's general ability, regardless of his ability in that particular trial, distorts the existing jurisprudence. of amnesia, amnesia may undermine the mens rea requirement of the crime because it suggests that the defendant experienced a dissociative state at the time of the conduct, thus not being able to form the requisite mental state. Because amnesia could undermine the mens rea requirement, much like the insanity defense, amnesiac defendants sometimes raise their condition under the insanity framework. The insanity defense excuses the defendant from criminal responsibility when his mental disease interferes with his ability to form the requisite intent to commit the crime. In Queen v M'Naghten, the English High Court acquitted the defendant who had killed the secretary of the Prime Minister 'by reason of insanity' and held that if 'at the time of committing the act, the accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing' then the defendant cannot be held criminally responsible. 50 Similarly, in Durham v United States, the D.C. Circuit Court held that 'an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect'. 51 The Model Penal Code also provides that 'a person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law'. 52 Today, most federal and state courts use one of these formulations of the insanity defense. 53 However, defendants who use the insanity defense framework to introduce their amnesia as an exculpating condition usually fail in their efforts. 54 The insanity defense is largely unsuccessful in practice; the defense is used in only about 1 per cent of criminal cases with a success rate of below 25 per cent. 55 Courts have also held that amnesia by itself cannot constitute an insanity defense. 56 It is available only if the memory loss is a symptom for an underlying mental disease, and even then, only certain types have been seen as legitimate. 57 Schizophrenic psychosis, for one, has proved successful in grounding the insanity defense in courts. 58 without meeting the mens rea requirement. However, this standard is applicable under very limited situations and is regulated by statutes, rather than common law. 50 
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